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Populism and populists 
in Europe – old and new 
Recent electoral results and political 
developments across Europe – 
North and South, East and West – 
have highlighted the rising impact of 
“populist” forces on both national 
polities and EU policies. While 
appreciation of the gravity of such 
populist challenge still varies, 
concern about its short-term effects 
is now widespread.  
BEPA has recently organised – in 
cooperation with some European 
think tanks – a workshop to reflect 
in more depth on the root causes, 
the drivers, the manifestations and 
veh ic l es ,  and  the  poss ib le 
consequences of what seems to be 
brewing up in Europe these days on 
the populist front. This issue of our 
Monthly Brief presents some of the 
points raised on that occasion and 
offers some addit ional  and 
sometimes unconventional food for 
thought to those who want to better 
understand a phenomenon that has 
different facets and multiple faces.  
What we talk about when we talk 
about “populism” 
The term populism is often used in a 
derogatory sense to describe a type 
of political discourse and style – 
usually an appeal to “the people” (us) 
against “the elites” (them) in defence 
of the (supposed) genuine interests 
of the citizens or a specific 
community, and against the political 
agenda of powerful “outsiders”.  
The populist discourse tends to 
oversimplify policy issues that are 
intrinsically complex, controversial 
and/or poorly explained to the 
public. It also tends to blend 
different ideological ingredients and 
to appeal to transversal groups of 
potential voters who share similar 
views. Its growing success often 
represents a symptom and symbol of 
broader difficulties and deficiencies 
a f f e c t i n g  a d v a n c e d  l i b e r a l 
democracies in dealing with both 
policies and citizens. 
Historically speaking, populism dates 
back to the agrarian movements of 
19th century America. Ever since, 
although some of its traits were 
discernible also in the totalitarian 
ideologies of the first half of the 
20th century, “populism” as we know 
it emerged after World War II in the 
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most diverse democratic political systems: from 
Latin America, where it has the most distinctive 
and durable roots, to the developing world; from 
France (Pierre Poujade in the 1950s) to the 
Scandinavian countries (since the 1970s); and 
once again in the US, in the 1990s, with Ross 
Perot. 
Most of the time, it focused on a single issue 
(high taxation in Northern Europe, NAFTA for 
Perot); it appealed to frustrated voters on both 
sides of the political divide, thus making it 
difficult to identify it with the extreme right (or 
left) only; and it materialised into “flash” parties 
with a very short life span. 
The rise (and decline) of populist forces and the 
spread of anti-EU rhetoric have not always gone 
hand-in-hand. Nordic countries have long 
experienced recurrent, if volatile, surges of 
populist parties and lists, often driven by tax 
revolt but mostly indifferent to European 
integration. Moreover, some regional parties 
initially combined support for the EU against the 
national state with elements of tax revolt and 
anti-immigration sentiments, often including 
xenophobic innuendos. Their record over time 
shows that maintaining a certain level of 
mobilisation among sympathisers and achieving 
some degree of institutionalisation permit such 
forces to consolidate, last, and even thrive. 
Alternatively, they deflate and disappear. 
For its part, vintage “euro-scepticism” originally 
shaped some core elements of the anti-EU 
arsenal, although Britain’s politics and 
constitution have mostly managed to contain its 
most destructive effects (though not its rhetoric). 
Elsewhere, both North and South, anti-EU 
arguments have often been popular on the left as 
part of an ideological – but not necessarily 
populist – platform in which opposition to neo-
liberal policies targeted especially the European 
Commission as their main agent and enforcer. 
The chances of success for populist forces have 
traditionally depended on the configuration of 
electoral systems: strict proportional 
representation has normally been a facilitator 
(especially for “flash” parties, also in the 
European Parliament), whereas bipolar and first-
past-the-post arrangements have curbed them.  
On the other hand, referenda have often 
represented – regardless of and well beyond the 
legitimate reasons for calling them – powerful 
catalysts for the spread of such sentiments and 
messages, entailing as they do an over-
simplification of the debate and recourse to a 
quintessential populist theme: just saying “No” 
to the establishment. Since 1992 (the referenda 
on Maastricht), in fact, popular votes on 
subsequent treaties have become recurrent 
occasions for campaigning against “Brussels” 
and consolidating a populist anti-EU narrative.  
This is also why it is virtually impossible now to 
resort or return to the old ways. The kind of 
permissive consensus that long characterised the 
European integration process – as driven by 
enlightened and far-sighted elites (the “blessed 
plot” described by the late Hugo Young) – is 
long gone. The risk now for EU policies is 
instead to be seen by angry voters as a “cursed 
plot”. 
The “new” populism 
Following the outbreak of the financial and 
economic crises (which in turn acts as a catalyst 
and multiplier), a number of developments have 
made populist forces and their embracing anti-
EU rhetoric a much more tangible phenomenon, 
in both electoral and public opinion terms. 
Declining social cohesion, rising immigration 
(often perceived as being much larger that it 
actually is), widening income disparities, growing 
uncertainty in times of change, and mounting 
dissatisfaction with the apparent lack of 
alternatives to austerity: this is the background 
against which a growing number of political 
“entrepreneurs” – mostly (but not only) on the 
right of the political spectrum – have started 
betting on the combination and mutual 
reinforcement of socio-economic and anti-EU 
populism with a view to exploiting the fears of 
European citizens.  
They emphasise dangers to identities and 
communities – be they local, national, historical 
or social. They try to appeal directly to voters, 
rather than activists, and to appeal to all voters, 
thus often reaching between 10 to 20 per cent of 
cast ballots. When that happens, in fact, they 
stop being a political symptom and symbol – and 
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start becoming a political factor, and a player in 
its own right.  
Some populist forces have indeed become either 
formal partners in or key parliamentary 
supporters of coalition governments. In some 
cases, they have managed to reshape public 
policies in a significant way, especially on 
immigration. In others, their record is more 
modest and their impact more of an indirect 
nature. In both cases, they have succeeded in 
creating additional obstacles to the kind of 
consensual decision-making that characterises 
the European integration process – be it on 
Schengen, enlargement, or EMU itself. 
Their success has also triggered a more or less 
evident race to catch up among established 
parties, who have changed their political agenda 
and language accordingly. Even when this new 
populism does not translate into electoral scores, 
in other words, it does permeate the political 
climate and is reflected in opinion polls and the 
media. 
On top of that, if and when mainstream parties 
coalesce for the common good (for instance, in 
various types of “grand coalition”), they risk 
further consolidating the gap between the 
established elites and “the people”and feeding 
the populist narrative.  
The new media 
Four years ago, political analysts were all 
enthralled by the use Barack Obama was making 
in particular of Facebook to mobilise young and 
new voters for his presidential bid. Just one year 
ago, the entire world was mesmerised by the 
formidable impact that Twitter and the new 
social media had on the uprisings in the Arab 
countries. But very few observers seem to be 
paying much attention in Europe to the political 
potential – in terms of both mobilisation and 
communication – that such new media enshrine, 
and to the effect they are already having on 
European politics and, alas, also the rise of 
populist forces.  
It would indeed be very difficult to understand 
the success of certain lists and campaigns across 
the Union – at local, regional, and national level 
– without focusing on the parallel universe 
created by and through the web. And this applies 
as much to more classic populist parties as to 
such new movements as “Occupy” or the 
“Pirates”, whose followership is less permeable 
to xenophobia and more in line with the liberal 
mindset of the “native” Internet generation.  
The social media have dramatically lowered the 
entry barrier to the public debate: they can and 
do shape new agendas (the campaign against 
ACTA is a case in point), provide new fora for 
discussion, and cast new light on how and where 
political views are formed in the 21st century. 
Here lies not only a risk but also an opportunity: 
lacking (still) a common European public space, 
why not make better use of a quintessentially 
cross-national cyberspace to fill the vacuum that 
an increasing number of EU citizens feel in 
terms of political participation and democracy? It 
is notably this vacuum that populist forces are 
trying to fill these days – with some success. 
Margaritis Schinas, Vice-President Olli Rehn and Philippe Legrain, at 
the seminar on populism, organised by BEPA on 25 April. 
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The real crisis in Europe is not a financial/economic 
one, but a much deeper social/political crisis, of 
which the financial/economic dimension is just a 
symptom. That deeper crisis has formed not just 
because there is a democratic deficit between the 
centre and the parts of the European Union, or 
because current European leaders are less devoted 
to genuine federal union than their predecessors. It 
has formed because of a cumulatively dramatic 
transformation of the very character of Europe’s 
liberal democratic regimes.  
The European project is characterized by policy 
without politics on the European level and 
politics without policy on the nation-state level. 
As such, it is an example of the contradictions 
not of capitalism, but of democracy itself. 
The European Union cannot be saved by its citizens 
because there is no European demos – but neither 
can it survive much longer as an elite project 
because the crisis has sharply escalated the process 
of dismantling the elite-guided democracies in 
Europe. 
The central political paradox of our time is in 
fact this: the crisis of trust in democratic 
institutions in Europe is the outcome not of the 
failure of the democratisation or integration of 
its societies but of the unbalanced success of 
both. Our present crisis, therefore, is not really 
about banks or money. It is not even about the 
institutional deficiencies of Europe. It goes 
deeper than all of that. 
Contradictions and inversions 
In the 1960s, many liberals feared that Europe’s 
democratic institutions remained hostages of the 
authoritarian cultures from which they had only 
recently emerged. World War II destroyed those 
regimes but not the underlying attitudes that had 
sustained them. Today we have the opposite 
problem: order does not destroy freedom, yet 
freedom destroys order.  
In today’s EU, citizens’ rights are protected, 
people have access to more information and are 
freer to travel and practice their lifestyles than 
ever. But these freedoms have increasingly 
paralysed Europe’s democratic institutions over 
the past forty years. Democratic societies are 
becoming ungovernable as the ideas of a common 
life and a public interest have gone missing. Trust 
in politicians has reached a new low. 
The current European economic crisis is 
producing two very different conceptions – or 
just practices – of democracy. In countries like 
Germany, the public’s influence in democratic 
politics is increasing; in countries like Greece and 
Italy, the public’s influence in (especially 
economic) decision-making is decreasing. What 
Berlin and Paris have to offer the citizens in 
Italy, Greece or Spain is a democracy in which 
the voters can change governments but not the 
basic economic policies of those governments. 
The logic of current proposals for strengthening 
the euro would take virtually all economic policy 
decision-making out of electoral politics, 
presenting citizens in debtor countries with the 
unappealing choice of either “democracy without 
choices” or “occupying” the streets. 
The results of this inversion are so strange to us 
that we have trouble naming and acknowledging 
what we are seeing – and we often do not, in 
fact, actually see them. Europeans increasingly 
come to the streets but not to the ballot boxes. 
They attack capitalism in moral terms, not in 
policy terms. They see their camp as an 
alternative but they cannot put a name to what 
their camp stands for. They have no leaders 
because they refuse to be anyone’s followers. 
Perhaps the strangest thing about today’s 
European rebels is that they seek to preserve the 
old status quo. We are thus witnessing 1968 in 
reverse. Then, students on the streets of Europe 
declared their desire to live in a world different 
from that of their parents. Now students are on the 
street to declare their right to live in the same 
world as that of their parents, but fear they cannot.  
This explains why most pan-European votes 
today end up as referenda on derailing the idea 
of “Europe” as a construct of the elites, by the 
elites and for the elites. Until recently, however, 
1 Europe’s democracy paradox 
By Ivan Krastev*  
* Ivan Krastev is Chairman of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia. 
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none of these votes – including the French and 
the Dutch “no” to the European Constitution – 
has stopped the European elite from pressing its 
project forward. The result is that, at the fringes 
of European societies at least, there are now 
deeply mistrustful, conspiracy-minded, 
uncomfortably significant minorities who are 
scared of the future. Fear on such a scale has 
consequences in politics we know all too well. 
Identity, globalisation, Europe 
Surprisingly, right-wing ideas find support on 
both the centre-right and the far left. In 
Denmark, Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands, 
Austria and Finland, anti-immigrant parties are 
now strong enough to re­shape national politics. 
In Central and Eastern Europe, fear of 
immigrants is not the defining political issue, 
principally because there are fewer immigrants. 
But levels of xenophobia and racism are 
nonetheless striking. They are, in fact, much 
higher than in Western Europe despite the 
absence of a significant number of immigrants. 
All over Western Europe, historical communities 
have witnessed their control over everyday life 
erode as ever more decisions are made by 
“Brussels”, the ECB, or corporate headquarters 
across the globe. At the same time, the look and 
feel of these communities has been destabilised 
by immigrants so numerous and culturally 
distinct as to seem impossible to assimilate. 
Today, threatened majorities are acting like 
aggrieved minorities. They blame the real or 
imagined loss of control over their lives on a 
conspiracy between cosmopolitan-minded elites 
and tribal-minded immigrants.  
Thus, ironically, Europe’s democratic institutions 
are more transparent than ever but less trusted 
than ever. Elites are more meritocratic but also 
more resented than ever. Our societies are more 
open and democratic than ever, but also less 
effective.  
The process of European integration succeeded 
in delegitimising the European nation-state but 
failed to create a common European public 
space and common European political identity. 
The populist grudge against the EU is a 
reassertion of more parochial but culturally 
deeper identities within individual European 
countries. This movement is driving European 
politics toward less inclusive, and possibly less 
liberal, definitions of political community. 
Publics in most European countries fear ageing 
and depopulation. They fear that immigrants or 
ethnic minorities are overtaking their countries 
and threatening their way of life. They fear that 
European prosperity can no longer be taken for 
granted and that Europe’s influence in global 
politics is in decline.  
The xenophobic Right, not the egalitarian Left, is 
benefiting most from the crisis in pure political 
terms. Yet the sharp Left-Right divide, which 
structured European politics ever since the French 
Revolution, is gradually blurring. Proletarian forces 
are now liable to be captured by decidedly anti-
liberal leaderships. And the emerging illiberal 
political consensus is not limited to right-wing 
radicalism: it encompasses the European 
mainstream itself. It is not what extremists say that 
threatens Europe: the real threat is what the 
mainstream leaders no longer say – for example, 
that diversity is good for Europe.  
Threatened majorities now express a genuine 
fear that they are becoming the losers of 
globalisation. Globalisation may have 
contributed to the rise of numerous middle 
classes outside the developed world, but it is 
eroding the economic and political foundations 
of the middle-class societies of post-World War 
II Europe. In this sense the new populism 
represents not the losers of today but the 
prospective losers of tomorrow. 
The new populism also differs dramatically from 
the traditional populist movements of the 19th 
and 20th centuries in its language, political 
objectives and ideological sources. It does not 
represent the aspirations of the repressed but 
rather the frustration of the empowered. It is not 
a populism of “the people” held in thrall by the 
romantic imagination of nationalists, as was the 
case a century and more ago; but a populism of 
the pragmatic complaint of majorities as 
manifested in almost daily published opinion 
polls. It is a kind of populism for which history 
and precedent have poorly prepared us. 
This is our real crisis, and it is a crisis of political 
culture. Everything else is a sideshow. The only 
way to save the European project, then, is to 
reinvent it. 
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Is Marine Le Pen’s strong showing in the first 
round of the French presidential election just a 
result of the crisis, as Nicolas Sarkozy claims? 
Or is it another sign that mainstream parties of 
both centre-right and centre-left are losing 
voters permanently? 
The Front National’s attraction of nearly one in 
five French voters follows electoral gains by 
populist parties across much of Europe. Once 
relegated the political fringes, these parties now 
command significant support in Austria 
(Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs), Belgium 
(Vlaams Belang), France (Front National), 
Hungary (Jobbik), the Netherlands (Partij voor 
de Vrijheid) and even the socialist bastions of 
Scandinavia (Dansk Folkeparti in particular). In 
some countries, they are the second- or third-
largest party and are seen as necessary members 
of coalition governments. Their policy 
platforms are characterised by an opposition to 
immigration and multiculturalism, and support 
for the protection of national identity. On 
economic policy, they are often critics of 
globalisation and they pledge to protect 
workers’ rights with rhetoric that sounds like 
that of the traditional Left.  
Often led by colourful, outspoken leaders, they 
do not fit easily into classic left/right political 
categories. Indeed, one of their attractions to 
voters seems to be that they break the mould by 
campaigning on issues that centrist parties of 
both traditional right and left in many countries 
are squeamish about discussing: immigration, 
race, religion and the downsides of 
globalisation. 
Populism is often assumed to be a cyclical 
phenomenon, with new protest parties and 
extremist movements gathering momentum 
because of the anger of voters who have lost 
their jobs and the fear of those who might be 
laid off next. The conventional analysis is that 
when economic times get tough, people blame 
the political elite and seek scapegoats for job 
losses among immigrants. Many mainstream 
politicians assume that they will win back voters 
when the economy recovers.  
A Facebook review  
This view is out of date and deeper changes are 
restructuring European politics, according to 
recent research undertaken by Demos, the 
cross-party think-tank based in London, and 
commissioned by the Open Society 
Foundations. A survey of the Facebook fans of 
populist parties shows that they are not no-
hopers at the bottom of the social scale, and 
many of them previously supported mainstream 
parties. What is more, they may not return to 
supporting the centre-right or left even if the 
European economy improves because they are 
not primarily drawn to populism because of 
concern about unemployment or recession. 
Rather, they are worried about cultural identity 
and they are mistrustful of elites in general. 
Over the summer of 2011, Demos surveyed 
over 13,000 Facebook fans of 15 of these 
parties in twelve European countries. This is a 
unique new way of collecting data, generating 
new insight into who these digital activists are, 
what they think, and how they combine their 
online and offline activities.  
The results are surprising, and should cause 
other parties to take note. The new generation 
of voters attracted to populist parties is not all 
the racist, xenophobic reactionaries sometimes 
portrayed. They are very young (around two-
thirds under 30) and overwhelmingly male – but 
they are not the losers of economic liberalism. 
They are generally employed and their 
education levels broadly match national 
averages.  
What draws them to support populist parties 
most are perceived threats to their national and 
cultural identity, especially from immigration 
and multiculturalism. Interestingly, younger 
respondents are even more likely to cite 
immigration than older respondents as a reason 
for joining. They consider mainstream 
2 The new face of  European politics is on Facebook 
By Jamie Bartlett* and Heather Grabbe**  
*Jamie Bartlett is director of the Violence and Extremism Program at Demos;  
**Heather Grabbe is director of the Open Society Institute-Brussels. 
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politicians to be out of touch, and incapable or 
unable to respond to their concerns: only 20 per 
cent trust their national governments 
(compared to 43 per cent for the public as a 
whole).  
Just 14 per cent trust the European Union, 
which they see as distant, ineffective, and a 
waste of money. They do not see the results of 
European integration as freedom to travel and 
greater economic opportunity, but a loss of 
border control (58 per cent) and a loss of 
cultural identity (56 per cent). They also lack 
faith in national pillars of democracy. Only 
30 per cent trust the judicial and legal system, 
which compares to 60 per cent on average in 
Europe, while only 12 per cent trust the 
mainstream media (for Die Freiheit fans, it is 
just 4 per cent).  
Given the explosion of propaganda and 
misinformation now widely available online, 
this is a cause for concern. Only the police and 
army command any sort of confidence among 
them, and even that respect falls below national 
averages. To quote one of the respondents on 
the question of why he switched his support: 
“They are the only honest party.” 
Populism is on the rise not only in the familiar 
spaces for political debate such as television, 
newspapers and doorstep campaigns, but also in 
the new political spaces of social media and 
internet forums. As formal membership of 
most political parties is falling across the 
continent, young people are increasingly using 
social media as a means of expressing their 
political preferences – whereas parties use them 
to organise, recruit and mobilise. Populist 
groups have been particularly adept at taking 
advantage of these new opportunities, especially 
through the most influential social media 
platform of all: Facebook.  
The Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs alone has 
over 80,000 Facebook fans. For some groups, 
their online following dwarfs their formal 
membership, and even that of far larger parties, 
perhaps because the openness of the Internet 
allows them far more freedom to reach voters 
with their views than traditional media outlets. 
For example, the Facebook page of Jimmie 
Akesson, leader of the Sverigedemokraterna has 
over 23,000 “likes” – far more than the current 
Prime Minister Reinfeldt.  
Most striking is that these people are not just 
armchair “clictivists”: they are motivated and 
active in the real world. Over 80 per cent of 
them think that it does matter who you vote for 
– and they do vote. At the last election, 67 per 
cent of them voted for the party they are a fan 
of (which might increase, because many 
respondents were too young to vote last time 
around). Twenty six per cent report having 
demonstrated or protested in the last 6 months, 
significantly higher than the European average 
of under ten per cent. Social media are a bridge 
into formal channels of politics, rather than a 
substitute for them. The “Occupy” movement 
shows the sort of impact that well-networked, 
internet-savvy groups can, and will continue, to 
have. 
New politics for all? 
This combination of virtual and real-world 
political activity is the way millions of people, 
especially the young, relate to politics in the 
21st century. It is no longer possible to 
understand the influence of populist political 
movements – and their opponents – just by 
looking at their voters or formal members. 
These new ways of organising also present 
opportunities for new ways of understanding 
trends in European politics.  
A significant number of Europeans are 
concerned about the erosion of their national 
culture in the face of immigration, the growth 
of Islam in Europe, European integration, and 
economic globalisation. Our research also 
offers a glimmer of hope for mainstream 
parties. Those online activists who were also 
active offline – by voting, demonstrating, or 
being part of a political party – were more 
democratic, had more faith in politics, and were 
more likely to disavow violence.  
This is powerful evidence that encouraging 
more people to become actively involved in 
political and civic life, whatever their party 
preference, should be top priority for all 
European politicians.  
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A new spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre 
of Pirates. This brand new political movement 
has emerged on the continental political 
landscape only recently. According to the polls 
and the number of adherents, however, it keeps 
growing in significance and strength. 
Founded in Sweden in 2006, the Pirate Party has 
inspired groups in many other EU countries to 
set up lists and organisations under the same 
label. So far, Pirates have won seats also in local 
or regional councils in Germany, Spain, Austria 
and the Czech Republic.  
Young, innocent and wired? 
The name “pirate” was chosen to refer to 
unauthorised music downloaders in Sweden 
(active since 2001), and was then adopted by the 
famous Swedish file-sharing website “The Pirate 
Bay”. The party emerged from the necessity to 
defend and extend the new so-called 
“information commons” – and from the fear of 
seeing individual freedoms restrained.  
The movement has its roots in youth culture and 
the so-called “netizens” (citizens of the net). 
Indeed, the core of the Pirates’ voters is young 
and online. Such core, however, is inadequate to 
explain the Pirates’ popularity and current 
success in the polls. The party also appeals to 
those who are disappointed by and disenchanted 
with the current state of politics at all levels.  
The Pirates do not seem to be a “classical” 
populist protest party: they are not “against” the 
system as such but rather “for” a different type 
and shape of politics, based on grassroots 
democracy and full transparency. Emerged from 
the Internet generation, used to its egalitarian 
culture, and convinced that the established 
parties are ignorant of and removed from their 
lifestyle, the Pirates see themselves as a 
community of citizens interested in political and 
social issues, driven by a genuine desire for a 
more participatory democracy.  
Their way of practising it is seen as a goal in 
itself, even when their proposals lack substance, 
coherence and depth (or, as in some areas, are 
utterly missing). Their core issues are indeed: 
fostering transparency in government, giving 
citizens a greater voice in decision-making, and 
reforming the concept of intellectual property. 
The Internet has remained their main source of 
inspiration as they aim to extend its free, 
democratic and egalitarian culture to other areas, 
thus broadening their political views to embrace 
a wider progressive agenda. 
From Sweden 
The Pirate Party of Sweden, the very first of its 
kind, was founded in 2006 following an ever 
increasing censorship of the Internet by public 
authorities in alliance with commercial interests, 
according to its founder Rickard Falkvinge. In 
the 2006 general elections it earned only 0.63% 
of the votes, becoming the third largest party 
outside parliament. Only three years later, 
however, the party gained an astonishing 7.1% in 
the elections for the European Parliament, 
upsetting the historically stable Swedish party 
system and gaining one seat. It was given an 
additional one later on, following the marginal 
seat reallocation prompted by the Lisbon Treaty. 
A couple of highly significant events occurred 
between these two elections: the 2006 raid by 
Swedish police on the file-sharing website “The 
Pirate Bay” (which, thanks also to wide media 
coverage, prompted a doubling of party 
membership); and the increased surveillance and 
control measures on music downloads and 
electronic “traffic” in general introduced by law 
(FRA and IPRED) in 2008-09. A third cause 
célèbre, namely the mobilisation against ACTA 
(Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement), is also 
likely to have a major impact on the political 
fortunes of the pirates – and to do so well 
beyond Sweden. 
The party officially claims it takes no stand on 
such traditional issues as tax and welfare 
distribution. Research about its members 
indicates a hybrid political orientation, with 
members originally from both left and right. 
Supporters tend to be young males, students in 
3 Pirates @ EC 
By Niklas Heusch, Erik Olsson and Carole Richard* 
*Niklas Heusch, Erik Olsson and Carole Richard are interns at BEPA. 
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the field of natural science or technical subjects, 
or unemployed aged between 15 and 30 – thus 
reflecting an image of individuals without a solid 
position on the labour market.  
Across Germany 
The past 15 months have marked a major 
breakthrough for the Pirate Party in Germany. It 
now has representatives elected in regional 
parliaments, namely: in the September 2011 
Berlin elections, the Pirates managed to 
overcome the 5% threshold with 8.9% of the 
votes, winning 15 out of 141 seats in the 
Abgeordnetenhaus; in the March 2012 elections 
in the Saar, they received 7.4% of the votes and 
won 4 seats in the Landtag.  
"By voting for the Pirates, one votes first and 
foremost for a different way of conducting politics 
– contents can be dealt with later", as the German 
weekly Der Spiegel put it. The 15 institutional 
representatives embody this different approach: 
debates within the party take place in public on 
blogs and Twitter; anybody can follow meetings of 
the parliamentary groups through online live-
streams; and elected politicians are on equal footing 
with those they represent. 
Through their online-voting software Liquid 
Feedback, for example, the Pirates frequently and 
easily give their members the chance to vote on 
and discuss most issues. Through Mumble, the 
Pirates’ software for conducting online 
conference calls, virtually anybody can engage in 
party discussions. This way of conducting politics 
is seen as goal in itself: to some extent, the means 
is the end, and the process the outcome. 
Unsurprisingly, reforming copyright and 
intellectual property legislation is high up on the 
Pirates’ agenda, although their proposals and 
demands appear bizarre and/or naïve to 
established political parties and commentators. 
Intellectual property, for instance, is seen as an 
antiquated barrier, aimed at limiting access to 
knowledge within information societies and 
serving solely commercial interests. However, 
lacking realistic proposals to reframe intellectual 
property, the Pirates are frequently portrayed as 
just keen “to download everything for free” and 
as contesting the right of creators to be paid for 
their work. In fairness, they have done little to 
rebut such criticism. 
As for “off-line” issues, the Pirates demand free 
access to education and local public transport. A 
call for a basic income – an automatic allowance 
paid by the state to all citizens, replacing most 
other welfare payments – and a proposal to 
legalise all drugs (yet combined with educational 
campaigns on their health and social effects) 
complement their agenda and cast them as a left-
leaning political force, albeit free of any 
traditional ideological baggage – and sometimes 
inconsistent.  
By offering only a vague political vision, 
however, the Pirates can appeal to a wider 
audience, serving as some kind of projection 
screen for the electorate’s hopes and preferences. 
The Pirates’ voters is indeed as diverse as its 
leaders, argues a recent study by the German 
Konrad Adenauer Foundation. The public face 
of the Pirates – composed of Marina Weisband, 
Gerwald Claus-Brunner, Christoph Lauer, and 
Martin Delius – is a mixed bunch of individuals 
who differ markedly in personality, background 
and political style, allowing them to represent 
and appeal to different currents among voters 
and sympathisers.  
Horizon 2014 
Notably this heterogeneity, coupled with the 
Pirates’ open culture, will also be their biggest 
challenge in the future. The narrowness of their 
political agenda may end up limiting their impact, 
whereas developing a comprehensive political 
vision may highlight underlying divisions and end 
up constraining its grassroots practice of politics.  
To date the Pirates have been more a political 
experiment than a party movement in its own 
right. But their own success – lately also in 
Catalunya, Tyrol, Prague – may bring change: 
having voted for them, supporters might expect 
the experiment to transform itself into a stable 
political feature.  
To continue to promote their ideals, and following 
on the continent-wide mobilisation against ACTA, 
the fledgling Pirate Parties across Europe agreed in 
April 2012 to work together for the 2014 
European elections by coordinating their 
campaigns and drafting a joint programme: another 
EU party “family” in the making, or just a crew? 
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The survey on “The Future of Europe” was 
conducted at the end of 2011 – a time of great 
uncertainty in and across Europe. Perhaps un-
surprisingly, citizens feel there is a gap between 
public opinion and the decisions taken by politi-
cal leaders. However, over half of Europeans 
express confidence in the ability of political lea-
ders in the EU to face up to the main global 
challenges.  
Among the 
other main fin-
dings of the sur-
vey: 
More than six in 
ten Europeans 
agree that the 
EU has suffi-
cient power and 
tools to defend 
Europe’s econo-
mic interests in 
the global eco-
nomy, even if 
the proportion 
of Europeans 
who disagree 
has increased 
since spring 
2011. The sur-
vey also reveals 
that Europeans 
broadly agree 
that globalisation requires common global rules. 
In this context, the survey finds widespread sup-
port for more decision-making at the EU level in 
a range of EU policy areas. Close to three-
quarters of Europeans support more decision-
making at a European level for ensuring econo-
mic growth, and almost two out of three for tac-
kling unemployment. In both cases, support is 
more widespread inside the euro-zone than out-
side it.  
Furthermore, a third of Europeans believe that 
the establishment of an economic government 
would be most helpful for the future of Europe 
– coming in third place after comparable living 
standards (mentioned by just above half of Euro-
peans) and comparable educational standards 
(mentioned by close to four in ten). 
Despite the gloomy situation, Europeans still say 
they are happy living in the EU and its Member 
States: just above three-quarters indicate that 
they are happy living in the EU and close to nine 
out of ten Euro-
peans are happy 
living in their 
own country. In 
particular, the 
survey reveals 
that Europeans 
cherish the qua-
lity of life in the 
EU, which they 
believe is better 
than in Brazil, 
India, China, 
Japan and the 
US. Behind this 
EU average, ho-
wever, lie signi-
ficant variations 
between Mem-
ber States – and 
in some coun-
tries the senti-
ment is marke-
dly negative. 
At the same time, views about the EU’s econo-
mic performance relative to other major econo-
mies (Brazil, China, India, Japan and the US) hig-
hlight the extent of public concern about the 
economic crisis: while the European economy is 
seen to be performing better than that of emer-
ging economies like Brazil and India, the Chi-
nese, Japanese and American economies are per-
ceived to be doing better than Europe’s. This 
concern has grown in intensity since autumn 
2009. 
A full report on the “Future of Europe” Euroba-
rometer is published at http://ec.europa.eu/
public_opinion/index_en.htm 
4 The future of  Europe – seen from its present 
By Eurobarometer 
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For a Revival of Europe 
In this commentary, Jacques Delors reminds the 
stranglehold in which the Economic and 
Monetary Union is caught. Not only is fiscal 
consolidation necessary to address this situation 
and boost growth and employment, but it is also 
imperative to restore confidence in Europe. The 
author looks at the international sources that 
have triggered the crisis in the Eurozone 
pointing to the absence of the completion of the 
EMU, which relies only on a monetary pillar 
rather than an economic one. He deplores the 
lack of coordination of economic policies in 
Europe and stresses the necessity to come back 
to the triptych: “competition, cooperation, and 
solidarity”. Finally, he holds that it is necessary to 
support the “Community method” and to better 
define the spheres of competences of the EU 
and its member states. 
http://www.notre-europe.eu/uploads/tx_publication/
SocialistEuropeanAlternative_J_Delors_NE_April20
12.pdf  
The European Union budget 2014-20: More 
boldness needed 
The EU budget has always been the cause of 
bitter arguments. The negotiations for the new 
long-term budget framework that are under way 
in 2012 are likely to become even tougher, as 
they are taking place against the backdrop of 
fiscal austerity in most member states. The EU 
agriculture policy should be reformed 
substantially, in particular by putting an end to 
lump sum payments to big farmers. Such a 
reform would free up more resources for a 
simplified and greener regional policy as well as 
for more spending on research and development, 
measures to strengthen the EU’s external border 
controls to protect Schengen, cross-border 
infrastructure, as well as foreign and defence 
policy. The euro crisis makes it more pressing 
that the EU budget does more for growth. 
http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/
attachments/pdf/2012/pb_budget_5april12-4897.pdf 
Choosing Cooperation over Conflict: Russia 
and the Euro-Atlantic security order 
With Putin once again taking the reigns as 
Russia’s president, it can be expected that the 
country will become a difficult partner for the 
West over the coming years. It is necessary, 
however, that there be continued efforts with 
Russia in order to dampen the systemic conflict 
over political order. As long as the question of 
how the Euro-Atlantic security order can 
incorporate Russia remains unresolved, it is not 
possible to fully realise the amount of security 
policy cooperation with Moscow necessary to 
address current local and global security 
challenges. The Georgian war of 2008 
emphatically demonstrated that this fragile 
relationship can worsen and take on crisis 
proportions as long as a stable system for 
cooperative security does not exist with Russia. 
http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/
products/comments/2012C10_kle_rsv.pdf 
European Economic Governance: The 
Union at a crossroads 
The harshness of the economic and financial 
crisis has allowed the debate on economic 
governance to move forward. Even if measures 
have been taken, they are not sufficient to 
overcome the difficulties and tackle future 
challenges. Policymakers had not initially correctly 
assessed the magnitude of the crisis. They were 
wrong in their diagnosis and have striven to 
reduce the economic governance of the Eurozone 
to an increased budgetary surveillance. This paper 
highlights the failures of the intergovernmental 
method at the expense of a stronger commitment 
by the European Parliament. The author 
advocates for enhanced economic governance 
based in particular on the creation of a European 
Treasury and Eurobonds. She also calls for the 
renegotiation of the Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance to include growth-
oriented policies. 
http://ifri.org/downloads/notecerfa94b.pdf  
5 Think Tank Twitter 
Think Tank Twitter (TTT) aims to provide regular information and updates on what is produced by think tanks and research centres across 
Europe (and beyond) on EU policy issues. As an analogy to the original Twitter, each summary – or tweet – does not exceed 140 words, rather 
than characters. Those who wish to signal new publications for possible inclusion can send them to the email address bepa-think-tank-
twitter@ec.europa.eu 
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An Assessment of the Commission’s 2011 
Schengen Governance Package: Preventing 
abuse by EU member states of freedom of 
movement? 
The Schengen system has recently been at the 
centre of sharp controversy arising from attempts 
by several member state governments (such as 
Denmark and France) to challenge the right to the 
free movement of persons and the abolition of 
internal border checks. This paper examines the 
European Commission’s response to the 
Schengen controversies, namely the Schengen 
Goverance Package published in September 2011 
and currently under negotiation in the Council 
and the European Parliament. It assesses the 
scope and added value of the Package’s two new 
legislative proposals – a new Schengen evaluation 
mechanism and revised rules for restating internal 
border checks – by looking at the origins and 
features of the debate surrounding liberty of 
circulation in the Schengen area. 
http://www.ceps.eu/book/assessment-commission%
E2%80%99s-2011-schengen-governance-package-
preventing-abuse-eu-member-states-free 
The EU Strategic Partnerships Review: Ten 
guiding principles 
The European Union needs to rethink its 
approach towards great and emerging powers in 
the multipolar era. The development of the 
concept of strategic partnerships was meant to 
address precisely this issue, but they still fail to 
deliver strategic results. As the EU is in the 
process of reviewing these partnerships, the 
author presents a list of ten principles that 
should guide this review exercise: strategic issues 
are central to strategic partnerships; strategic 
partnerships grow out of cooperation on 
concrete issues; summits are one part of the 
strategic partnerships process; strategic 
partnerships go beyond bilateral relations, are 
compatible with effective multilateralism, at odds 
with the regional approach and part of a broader 
strategic framework ; greater coordination is 
needed; the transatlantic partnership is a strategic 
asset; and the list of strategic partnerships is 
flexible. 
http://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/12/sec-gov/
ESPO_PB_2_TenPrinciples_FINAL.pdf 
Moldova Deserves More from the EU 
In spite of chronic political instability, Moldova 
has made considerable political and economic 
progress over the past two and a half years. 
However, the popularity of the current 
government is lower than ever, and the country 
may face a third early parliamentary election 
within three years. Torn between the EU and 
Russia, Moldova (especially the young 
generation) is more attracted by the Union, 
because it will more likely bring long-term 
economic development. In line with its wish to 
join the EU, Moldova has conducted reforms, 
reinforced cooperation with the Union, and 
worked hard to implement EU conditions (e.g. 
for visa liberalisation). Despite these efforts, the 
EU is reluctant to continue enlargement. Yet, as 
promised, it should offer more support and 
closer integration for countries, such as 
Moldova, that undertake democratic reforms. 
h t t p : / / w w w . f i i a . f i / e n / p u b l i c a t i o n / 2 5 2 /
moldova_deserves_more_from_the_eu/  
 
The Case for Renewing Transatlantic 
Capitalism 
The report underlines that only by joining forces 
can Europe and the United States most 
effectively respond to current economic 
challenges, reinvigorate economic growth and 
job creation and overcome the shortcomings of 
transatlantic capitalism. Accordingly, it provides 
policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic with a 
set of recommendations, including: organising an 
annual strategic economic dialogue involving 
officials from the US Federal Reserve, the 
European Central Bank, the US Treasury, 
finance ministers from EU member states and 
relevant officials from the European institutions. 
It also suggests resolving the remaining obstacles 
to a new comprehensive framework for financial 
regulation; and negotiating common rules for 
subsidies and the practices of state-owned 
enterprises – rules on inward investment and 
government procurement – to ensure the 
maintenance of genuine global market standards. 
ht tp ://www.a t lan t i c cap i ta l i sm. eu/r e sour c e s/
NAC_report_final_light.pdf  
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Evénements 
Les 17 et 18 avril, le Groupe européen d’éthique 
se réunissait pour la 13ème fois à Bruxelles. Le 
Groupe a accueilli deux experts qui ont fait des 
présentations sur le thème de l’énergie. Les 
présentations sont disponibles sur le website du 
BEPA: http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/european-
g r o u p - e t h i c s / d o c s / p d f /
furfari_ege_hearing_170412.pdf) et http://
ec.europa.eu/bepa/european-group-ethics/
d o c s / p d f /
the_energy_issue_in_europe_p._colona.pdf)).  
Le 23 avril, le BEPA a organisé conjointement 
avec l’Association européenne de la pensée libre 
un colloque sur le thème : « Un partenariat pour 
la démocratie et une prospérité partagée : une 
volonté commune de promouvoir les droits et 
libertés démocratiques dans les pays du sud de la 
Méditerranée ». Ce colloque se tenait dans le 
cadre du dialogue de la Commission avec des 
organisations philosophiques ou non 
confessionnelles (Article 17, TFUE). 
 L’audience était principalement composée de 
membres de l’AEPL et de personnel de la 
Commission européenne (BEPA, DEVCO) ainsi 
que du SEAE. Jean-Claude Thébault, le directeur 
général du BEPA, a notamment rappelé à cette 
occasion l’engagement et l’action de la 
Commission européenne vis-à-vis des pays du 
Printemps Arabe. Le professeur Abdelaziz 
Kacem est quant à lui venu témoigner de son 
ressenti un an après le soulèvement de son pays 
la Tunisie. Christian Jouret du SAEE et Andrew 
Jacobs de la Commission ont pour leur part 
expliqué les mesures mises en œuvre par l’UE 
depuis un an au Moyen Orient et en Afrique du 
nord, dans le contexte de la politique européenne 
de voisinage. 
Le 24 avril s’est tenu le séminaire « Multipolarité 
et son impact sur l’Union européenne : 
Intégration ou désintégration ? » organisé par 
l’Institut d’Etudes Européennes de l’ULB et 
FRIDE, en collaboration avec la DG Recherche 
et Innovation et le BEPA. Cet événement a 
permis à des experts, des décideurs politiques et 
des universitaires d’échanger leurs vues sur la 
multipolarité, l’émergence de nouveaux acteurs 
sur la scène internationale, et les conséquences 
que cela entrainait pour l’Union européenne en 
termes de cohésion et d’intégration.  
Le 25 avril s’est déroulé un atelier sur le 
populisme, organisé par le BEPA en coopération 
avec les think tanks Open Society Institute de 
Bruxelles et Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik de 
Berlin. Les discussions ont porté sur les facteurs 
d’évolution du populisme en Europe et sur la 
manière dont devrait être abordée ce 
phénomène. Une séance inaugurale consacrée a 
une analyse comparative du “populisme” en 
Europe était suivie d’un déjeuner de discussion 
libre en présence des services du Président. Le 
Vice-Président en charge des affaires 
économiques et financières Olli Rehn a participé 
à une table ronde dans l’après midi qui portait 
sur les réponses possibles au phénomène du 
populisme. Des représentants de la Commission 
et des experts travaillant dans des think tanks ou 
issus du monde universitaire ont participé au 
débat.  
Activité à venir 
Le BEPA organisera le 7 mai en collaboration 
avec l’unité de planification politique du 
Secrétariat général de l’OTAN un déjeuner 
portant sur “L’Union européenne, l’OTAN et la 
montée en puissance de l’Asie”. Cet événement 
sera l’occasion pour des représentants de la 
Commission européenne, du Service européen 
pour l’action extérieure et de l’OTAN d’échanger 
leurs vues sur le thème.  
Un séminaire consacré aux relations entre l’UE 
et la Russie se déroulera le 21 mai, en 
collaboration avec le centre moscovite de 
Carnegie Endowment. Ce séminaire réunira 
notamment la spécialiste de la Russie Hélène 
Carrère d’Encausse ainsi qu’une vingtaine 
d’experts russes. Ce séminaire permettra de faire 
le point sur la situation en Russie après les 
élections présidentielles, ainsi que sur les 
questions de sécurité, d’énergie, de commerce et 
de voisinage.  
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